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ABSTRACT 
The Life, Death, and Afterlife of the "Terminator Gene": 
The Intersection of Biotechnology, Globalization, 
and Politics in India (April 2004) 
Joshua Dee Siepel 
Department of Biochemistry and Biophysics 
Texas AEcM University 
Fellows Advisor: Dr. Jonathan Coopersmith 
Department of History 
In March 1998, the United States government granted a patent for a new technology 
that allowed for the production of seeds that would grow for only one generation. 
The intent of the patent was to protect intellectual property and to prevent gene flow 
from genetically modified crops to other plants. Opponents of genetically modified 
organisms seized on the patent as a symbol of the danger of biotechnology, dubbing 
the new technology the "terminator gene. " News of the gene soon spread to the 
developing world, especially India, where angry farmers' groups burned test plots of 
genetically modified cotton that did not contain the suspect gene. This controversy 
was one of the first flash points in the developing world in the global debate about 
agricultural biotechnology. In this project, I used contemporary news accounts and 
recent criflcal papers to examine the events in India, with specific focus on the 
reactions of major stakeholders to the conlroversy. The responses of government 
officials ranged from silence at upper levels of government to angry cries by state 
ministers for the expulsion of all multinational corporations. Monsanto, which 
received the brunt of the protesters' anger, shifted its response from a cold, corporate 
message to a &iendly perspective voiced by Indians. Non-governmental 
organizations fomented the controversy by providing the protesting farmers groups 
with media coverage. For most of the major stakeholders, the events in India proved 
to be a source of much negative publicity at the time, but ultimately became a 
learning experience that helped them to adapt to the unique political and social 
climate surrounding the introduction of biotechnology in the developing world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1990s, biotechnology was still in its developmental stages. ' The first 
genetically modified (GM) food, a yeast, had been approved in the late 1980s. By 199$, 
GM crops were being grown in several countries, with the number steadily increasing. 
The most significant force behind the growth of agricultural biotechnology was the 
American agrochemical corporation Monsanto, It had been aggressively pushing 
biotechnology-derived crops for several years, and had had only middling success in 
navigating the regulatory systems in the countries where it had sought approval. The 
company was in an ill-fated push to aggressively introduce its products around the 
world. 
In addition, activist groups concerned about the effects of globalization and the 
rise of multinational corporations were beginning to find a powerful new networking 
technique: the Internet. Suddenly, disparate groups around the world were able to 
communicate and keep abreast of developments in the issues they supported. One such 
issue was the rise of biotechnology. With many Europeans repulsed by the supposed 
impinging on their food supply and others worldwide suspicious of the motives of the 
large corporations like Monsanto, activists saw an opportunity to launch a global battle 
against biotechnology. 
Meanwhile in India, the continued consequences of the Green Revolution, 
primarily the dependence on pesticides and fertilizers, had led many poor farmers into a 
cycle of debt. For some, the only escape from their situation was suicide. With the 
' This thesis follows the style and format of the Chicago Manual of Style, Fifteenth Edinan. 
Indian counuyside full of stories of farmer suicides and with public opinion rife with 
unhappiness over the effects of globalization, the situation had the potential to explode. 
The news that a company allied with Monsanto had patented a technology that 
would allow farmers to only grow one generation of seed would prove to be the spark 
that would ignite a firestorm. The events in India resulted in several test fields being 
burned and public confidence in biotechnology and the Indian regulatory system heavily 
shaken. 
This project seeks to examine the events in India around the so-called 
"terminator gene" to construct a narrative and examine the reaction of the stakeholders 
in the controversy. In particular, this project will examine the three main stakeholders in 
the controversy: the national and state officials in India who created policy to react to 
the events, Monsanto, and the activist organizations (including non-governmental 
organizations snd farmers' yeups) who led the protest. By understanding their 
responses to the situation, it is possible to gain a perspective on the ways in which the 
parties in future discussions over biotechnology can facilitate dialogue that is 
constructive and fair to both the issues and the citizens affected by the technology. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The controversy over the genetic use restriction technology, or 'terminator gene, ' 
took place over a period of eighteen months in 1998 and 1999. Because the controversy 
was only the first in a series of public debates over biotechnolo~, fairly little critical 
examination of the controversy and resulting policies has taken place, with the most 
relevant critical work published only within the past year. 
To conduct a critical analysis of policy decisions relating to the controversy, a 
narrative is essential. The best initial source for narrative information remains the 
original Indian news accounts, especially from India's national and regional newspapers. 
Although the quality of the Indian media's coverage of the controversy ranges from 
excellent to highly dubious, Indian news sources on the whole provide a I'iamework on 
which to base additional analysis. In some cases, the regional newspapers also provide 
useful insight into the perspectives and education levels of their readers; their lack of 
clarity and scientific perspective information provide an idea of the messages the 
average Indian citizen received during the controversy. In some cases, the specific 
voices of supporters and opponents to the technology did not receive adequate coverage. 
The works of biotechnology opponents, including the Rural Advancement Foundation 
International (now the ETC Group) and the author Vandana Shiva, help to compensate 
for that gap; likewise, publications by Monsanto and USDA provide the supporters' 
perspective on the situation. For more factual information, perhaps the best reference is 
the original patent itself. 
Ronald Herring's 2001 lecture at Columbia University represents the first real 
overview of the biotechnology debate in India. While his lecture focuses on 
biotechnology opponents' techniques and rationale more than political responses to the 
situation, it still provides a valuable tool for examining the public debate. In sharp 
contrast to Herring's political examination of activists' motivations, Visvanathan and 
Parmar present the biotechnology controversy as a sociological and mythological battle, 
in which the stakeholders fighting for victory represent a variety of classical archetypes. 
Although their work is interesting, its usefulness is limited by the authors' desire to 
present political realities as abstract, archetypal dilemmas. 
Shortly after the end of the political fight in India over Bt cotton in late 2001, a 
new body of research began to emerge. Ian Scoones, one of the foremost researchers in 
this new field, published two papers in 2003 and co-authored a third, arguing 
convincingly that the biotechnology debate represents an emerging political paradigm 
that is highly complex and based on a variety of political and social issues. ' He argues 
Oliver, M. J. ei al. Coniml of Plant Gene Expression. United States Patent 5, 723, 765, filed June 7, 1995, 
and issued March 3, 1998. 
Herring, Ronald J. 2001. Promethean Science, Pandora's Jug: ConflictsAround GeneticallyModifie 
Organisms in India. 2001 Mary Keaiinge Das Lecture, Columbia University, New York, December 3, 
2001. 
4 Visvanaihan, Shiv, and Chandrika Panner. "A Bioiechnology Story: Notes from India, " Economic and 
Politica! Weekly. July 6, 2002, 2714-2724. 
s Scoones, Ian. Regulatory Manosuvrest the Bt Cotton Controversy in India, IDS Working Papers 197. 
Brighton, UK: Institute for Development Studies, 2003, Seshis, Sheila, and Ian Scoones. Tracing Policy 
Connections: the Politics of Knowledge in the Green Revolution and Blotechnologv Eras in India, IDS 
Working Papers 188. Brighton, UK: Institute for Development Studies, 2003; 
that biotechnology may be viewed as a window to changes taking place in Indian 
government and society. Scoones' assertion is challenged by Peter Newell, who argues 
that, despite the number of stakeholders, Indian biotechnology policy is primarily based 
on a close-knit group of well-connected individuals within the Indian biotechnology 
industry. In their discussions of the development of Indian biotechnology policy, 
Herring, Newell, Scoones, and several others have emphasized the importance of 
knowledge to the political debate. Within their broad arguments, all have thus far 
neglected the curious phenomenon in which the 'terminator' technology lived on as a 
political idea far past its official discontinuation in October 1999. This project seeks to 
explore this question and the related issues surrounding policymakers' responses to the 
'terminator' controversy. This information about knowledge and political response will 
help to kame future analyses of biotechnology policy in the developing world. 
Scoones, Ian. Making Policy in the "New Economy": the Case of Bi otschnology in Karnataka, 1ndta, 
IDS Working Papers 196. Brighton, UK: Institute for Development Studies, 2003. 
6 Netvetl, Peter. Biotech Firms, Biotech Politics: Negotiating GMOsin India, IDS Working Papers 201. 
Brighton, UK: Institute for Development Studies, 2003. 
BACKGROUND 
The events that transpired in India in 199$ and 1999 around the so-called 
"terminator gene" presented perhaps the first major public outcry over biotechnology in 
the developing world. The backlash surrounding the 'terminator' controversy tapped 
into a common fear of citizens of developing nations: that the looming influence of 
multinational corporations would create a new colonial situation in which farmers are 
beholden to faceless powers. By examining the events around the controversy, it is 
possible to observe the manner in which the stakeholders adapted their previous 
approaches to crises in public opinion to ftt the case of biotechnology in the developing 
world. 
Development of the Genetic Use Restriction Technology (GURT) 
Traditionally, the purchase of seeds granted the farmer the implicit permission to 
use the seeds produced by the crop for future years' use. With the rise of value-added 
crops (like hybrids), the need to protect the knowledge behind these crops became 
evident. In the 1930s, the United States and Europe established laws and regulations 
protecting plant breeders, and giving them rights over their crops . While these laws 
were helpful, the greatest asset for IPR (intellectual property right) protection was the 
development of hybrid seeds, which have strongly decreased yields if the second- 
generation seeds are grown. ' 
Visvaaathan aad Parmar, 2717-2722. 
' Ibid. 
This protection is not present in seeds that are genetically modified. GM seeds 
are more similar to seeds from non-hybrid plants, in that seeds from one generation are 
functionally equal to those &om the generation before. The tremendous cost of 
developing new GM crops, combined with the lack of IPR protection, led a number of 
seed companies to research potential ways to protect their crops by limiting use of the 
GM traits to those who have paid the technology fee. At the same time, concerns about 
gene flow to non-GM plants had led some to call for the development of a technology 
that would prevent GM plants from passing on their genetic material. In response to 
these concerns, one seed company, Delta &. Pine Land Company (DdbPL) entered into a 
cooperative research agreement with the United States Department of Agriculture to 
develop a genetic mechanism for IPR protection. ' 
The technology that resulted (rom the collaboration was delineated in a US 
patent filed in March 1998. The proposed 'Technology Protection System' would allow 
a company to sell seeds that would grow successfully for one cycle, but that would not 
produce viable seeds. 
How the GURT 8'ops 
In order to best understand the controversy, the mechanism of the technology 
itself should be explained. ' The system consists of three genes. The first gene codes 
for a repressor protein. The second gene contains, in order, a promoter, a repressor 
binding site, and a gene that codes for a recombinase protein. (A recombinase will cut 
1nre//ecnra/ Property Today, "Delta and Pine Land Company and USDA Announce Receipt of Varietal 
Crop Protection System Patent, " April 1998. http: //www. lexisnexis. corn 
"More in-depth discussion can be found in Martha Crouch's article on the technology or on the excellent 
web site coordinated by Pat Byme. 
out a certain sequence of any other given gene or DNA sequence. ) The third gene 
consists of a late promoter, a blocker sequence, and a lethal gene. Under normal 
circumstances, the repressor protein made by the first gene will bind to the repressor 
binding site in the second gene, preventing the transcription of the recombinase, thus 
allowing the blocker sequence in the third gene to prevent expression of the lethal gene. 
The system is activated by treating the seeds with tetracycline, which 
competitively inhibits the repressor binding site in the second gene. Without the 
repressor, the recombinase gene is transcribed, producing a protein that excises the 
blocker sequence. The late promoter on the third gene then works to transcribe the lethal 
gene, which can work in a variety of ways. " The lethal gene will then stop the seed 
&om developing any further. 
The Indian Agriculture Crisis and Biotechnology 
The lsURT issue came at a time when several regions of India were seeing a 
wave of farmer suicides stemming fiom spiraling debt, often caused by sales of 
fraudulent seeds, rampant pests, and destructive weather. ' This sensitive issue, in 
combination with a variety of other problems facing farmers, had given strength to 
militant farmers' groups like the Karnataka Rajya Ryota Sangha (KRRS), or Karnataka 
Farmers Association. While most farmers' organizations were normal participants in the 
political process, the KRRS had become a leading radical force in opposing 
" The patent states that "any" lethal gene can be used, a contention that was the source of much valid 
criticism. Critics point out that use some genes (such as diphtheria toxin) could modify the nutritional 
Etto perties of the seeds or increase their toxicity. 
Lambrecht, Bill. Dinner at the New Gene Cafe: Hmv Genetic Engineering Is Changing What We Eat, 
How We Live, and)he Gicbai pa1ittcs of Food. NewVork: Thomas Dunne Books, 200k 
globalization in India. Led by its charismatic leader, Dr. M. D. Nanjundaswamy, the 
group had cultivated a media-&iendly image by such telegenic protests as the destruction 
of a newly opened Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Bangalore and participating in 
the violent disruption of the Miss Universe pageant in India in 1996. ' 
Because the biotechnology industry was still in its infancy, there had been little 
controversy over the safety or utility of biotechnology. Since the late 1980s, Monsanto 
had been pushing for approval of its Bollgard cotton, a crop that is modified to resist the 
American bollworm, a pest that (despite its name) attacks cotton crops worldwide. 
Bollgard expresses the Br gene, which comes trom a soil bacterium that is lethal to the 
bollworm. The approval process for Bollgard cotton had begun in 1990, when Monsanto 
approached the Deparmtent of Biotechnology (DBT) seeking approval. ' This was 
rejected in 1993, with DBT citing high technology transfer fees as grounds for the 
denial. However, in 1995 the Indian seed company Mahyco, which was in partnership 
negotiations with Monsanto, received permission to import 100g of Monsanto's cotton, 
whirh it used in the following years to backcross with Indian varieties. Mahyco was 
(and remains) the best-known seed company in India; its leader, B. R. Barwale, was one 
of the leaders of the Green Revolution and is seen as a hero of indian agriculture. In 
1998, Monsanto, seeking the business and reputation' benefits from a partnership, 
purchased a 26'/o stake in Mahyco, and the two jointly created Mayhco-Monsanto 
Biotech (India), with the intention of using biotechnology to develop crops. " 
' Crosseiie, Barbara. "An India Less Than Congenial, " ¹w York Times, November 24, 1996. 
www. nytimes. corn 
"Newell, 7-8 
" Ibid. 
10 
NARRATIVE 
When the United States government granted a patent for the "technology 
protection system" to DdbPL and USDA in March 1998, D8cPL's situation had changed. 
Since the joint research initiative had begun, Monsanto had begun negotiations to buy 
DfkPL for its extensive holdings in cotton breeding. ' 
On the day the patent was granted, the Canada-based NGO Rural Advancement 
Foundation International (RAFI) issued a press release dubbing the new technology 
"terminator" and warning of the effects of the technology in the developing world, 
where seed saving was much more common. ' In India, the concerns about the 
"terminator" technology soon coalesced with the pending approval of Monsanto's 
modified cotton and the general lack of public awareness about biotechnology to create a 
single issue, and reports began to spread that Monsanto was secretly testing the 
"terminator gene" in India. The tale grew taller as reports spread that Monsanto had a 
technology to kill plants and enslave farmers that was being tested in Indian. Despite 
efforts by top scientists to clearly delineate between the Bt and 'terminator' 
technologies, the nuances of their explanations went largely unrecognized among the 
farmers ' 
Any official concerns were amplified with the announcement by the KRRS on 
October 23, 1998 that it would begin protesting the technology in Karnataka, the group's 
' The proposed merger between the two companies fell apart in late 1999 after antitrust concerns were 
raised by the U. S. Justice Department. 
' RAFI. "US Patent on New Genetic Technology Will Prevent Farmers from Saving Seed, " 
http: //www. etcgroup. org/article. asp7newsid=64 
"It should be pointed out that the farmers had good reason to be concerned about multinational 
corporations, if for no other reason than India's consistent exploitation by outsiders for the past several 
centuries. 
home state, and elsewhere in the country. " The protests continued until November 27, 
when Nanjundaswamy issued an ultimatum to the Indian government to stop the trials of 
the Bollgard plants in Karnataks. The test plants, he claimed, were in violation of Indian 
law. According to the Hindustan Times, when asked about Monsanto's assertion that 
the Bollgard and the "terminator" were two different technologies, and that only 
Bollgard actually existed, Nanjundaswamy replied that there was no difference between 
transgenic crops and "terminator" seeds, and again warned that the technology would 
hurt the environment and reduce yields. He then accused Monsanto of being 2I 
responsible for the spate of farmer suicides in Andhra Pradesh. 
With the government unresponsive to his ultimatum, Nanjundaswamy's KRRS 
group gathered the next day in the village of Malladgudda. In troat of members of the 
media, Nanjundaswamy and approximately forty other farmers gathered at a test plot 
where the test seedlings were growing. With the farmer's permission, the KRRS burned 
the crop amid signs reading "Cremation Monsanto" and "Monsanto Quit India. ' ' In the 
subsequent press conference, Nanjundaswamy claimed that that the seeds contained the 
"terminator" gene, which, he claimed, would also deplete the soils. Furthermore, he 
claimed that Monsanto had distributed the seeds without government knowledge or 
"PT/. "Ksrnstsks Farmers Protest Against Multinational Corporation Monsanto, " October 23, 1998. 
h lip://www. lexienexis. corn 
Hindus/an Times. "Ryths Ssnghs Threatens io Bum 'Terminator' Saplings, " November 27, 1998. 
http: //www. lexisnexis. corn 
" Ibid. 
Although forty wss the number reported in initial news reports, stories in the following weeks would 
report the count of farmers to be in the hundreds 
Seshis, Sheila. "Plant Variety Protection snd Farmers' Rights in India: Lnw-Making snd the 
Cultivation of Varietal Control. " Economic and Po/i//ca! JPeek/y. 6 July 2002, 2741-47. Seshis discusses 
the context for the KRRS' actions snd provides more historical background on its protests. 
tt/ndn. "KRRS Members Bum Monsanto's Crop. " November 28, 1998. htip://www. lexisnexis. corn 
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permission. He then announced plans to burn cotton plots in six other locations around 
India. 
After another crop burning in the Andhra Pradesh village of Urugaonda, KRRS 
announced its plans to burn additional crops in the village of Bannikallu on December 2. 
In a statement to Business Line, Nanjundaswamy listed his group's demands: to "stop 
genetic engineering tests; not to allow patenting on life forms and to banish Monsanto 
from the country and to withdraw from the WTO. ' In addition, he announced his plans 
to file a criminal lawsuit against Monsanto, the state and national governments, the state 
agricultural minister, and the national Department of Biotechnology. 
Shortly thereafter, the Andhra Pradesh government, bowing to legislative 
pressure, pulled all of test plots, instead requiring any testing of the Bt cotton to take 
place at the state's agricultural university, under the observation of agricultural 
scientists. With the Andhra Pradesh tests discontinued but tests in other states 
continuing, the KRRS groups next targeted a plot in Haveri for burning in the next few 
days. The farmer who owned the plot, Shankrikoppa, was a former KRRS member who 
had rejected the group's ideology. ' After initially being willing to acquiesce to the 
KRRS' plans, he changed his mind after receiving a request from a farm organization 
affiliated with the 8JP (the ruling Hindu fundamentalist party) to prevent the burning. 
He asked for police protection, and the KRRS groups were prevented from burning the 
' Business Line. "To Continue Protest. " December 2, 1998. http:Ihvww Jexisnexis. corn 
Express News Service. "Monsanto Told to Stop Field Trials. " December 3, 1998. 
http:/Avww. taxi sn axis. eom 
"Hemng, Ronald J. 2001. Promethean Science, Pandora's Jug: Conflicts Around Genetically Modified 
Organisms in India. 2001 Mmy Kestinge Das Lecture, Columbia Universiiy, New York, December 3, 
2001. 
13 
field. Afier the cotton season had ended, he was able to grow plants Irom the Bt cotton 
seeds, disproving arguments of any gene protection technology in the plants. 
Shankrikoppa would later refer to the entire display as a "cheap publicity stunt. " He soon 
found new employment, as Monsanto hired him shortly after he harvested his first Bt 
crops to preach the virtues of GM cotton and biotechnology. 
Shankrikoppa's refusal helped to cool the fires of public opinion. With their 
momentum disrupted, the KRRS' enthusiasm waned. As the issue faded, the 
controversy became old news, and it seemed to slip I'rom the public consciousness just as 
alarm was beginning to rise in developed nations. As debates began in Europe and the 
United States, Monsanto and the USDA came under more and more fire, with 
condemnations coming from governments and organizations around the world. The most 
stinging criticism came from Gordon Conway, president of the Rockefeller Foundation 
and a strong supporter of biotechnology, who publicly chastised the Monsanto's Board 
of Directors for not dropping the technology. 
With opposition rising and the entire situation quickly becoming a public 
relations disaster, Monsanto CEO Robert Shapiro announced on October 4, 1999, that 
the company would not commercialize the technology. This news was met with a 30 
mixture of joy and reservation by those who had expressed concern about the 
technology. While the overall reaction, especially in India, was that of relief, 
Newell, 20. 
Lambrecht, Bill. "Foundation Chief Urges Monsanto to Go Slow on Gene-Altered Foods, " Sr. Louis 
Pcs/-Dispatch, June 3D, 1999. 
Shapiro, Robert B. Open Letter from Robert B. Shapiro to Gordon Conway. October 4, 1999. 
http: //www. monsanto. corn/monsanto/gurt/index. htm 
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environmental groups (especially RAFI) made clear their discontent that Monsanto had 
not disavowed all potential IPR-protection technologies. ' 
With this announcement, the 'terminator gene' was dead, at least officially. The 
idea that the 'terminator' gene still existed as a threat continued for a number of years, 
largely because of the assumption that Bt technology and 'terminator' technology were 
the same thing. One reason for the idea's persistence was that about a week after the last 
field had burned, news broke that a patent application for the GURT had been submitted 
in India by the USDA (as the lead applicant) and DtkPL. ' The application was one of 
85 applications made around the world. Because a patent claim was filed, some later 
sources would use the existence of the application as irrefutable proof that the 
technology was in existence in immediately applicable form. ' The patentability of the 
technology was clarified from the Ex Parte Hibbard ruling of 1985, which allowed 
biotechnology methods, even conceptual ones, to be patented. ' This added yet another 
nuance to the general public's confusion about the technology, and enabled the fears 
about the 'terminator' to outlast the GURT itself. 
' Monsanto was known at the time to be developing a second-generation GURT in which the plant would 
only express its transgenic qualities if treated with a chemical purchased trom the company. This 
technology is still in development; see RAFI "Suicide Seeds on Fast Track to Commercialization, " 
February 25, 2000. http: //www. etcgroup. org/search. asprpage=3drtheme=7 
Business Line, "USDA Seeks Patent in India, " December 14, 1998. http: //www. lexisnexis. corn " Misny, Shared, "Pressure Mounts Against Terminator Gene" Financial Express, December 21, 1998 
Fisher, William W. "The Impace of "Terminator Gene" Technologies on Developing Countries, " 
Report to United Kingdom Department for International Development, December 1999. 
http: //www. law. harvard. edu/faculty/tfiah sr/terminator. html 
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STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
National and State Governments 
With the patenting of the "terminator" technology by D JkPL and USDA in 
March 1998 and the resultant attention I'rom NGOs such as RAFI and GRAIN (Genetic 
Resources Agriculture International, an anti-GMO group based in Spain), the Indian 
Council of Agricultural Researchers (ICAR), a leading panel of agricultural experts, 
issued a statement expressing concern about the technology. ' In July, on further 
recommendation iiom ICAR, the directorate of plant protection for quarantine and 
storage of the Indian Department of Agriculture announced a ban on importation of 
seeds containing the "terminator" gene. Under the new measure, import authority was to 
"confirm" that incoming seeds did not contain the gene in question before authorizing 
the importation. 
One issue that would emerge as key in the decision-making process was the 
murky circumstances that resulted the test plots of Bollgard plants. The Indian Review 
Committee on Genetic Manipulation (RCGM) granted approval on July 27 and August 5 
for MMB to test the Bollgard plants. Tests were planned in foriy locations in nine states. 
However, Shiva et al report that tests were actually taking place starting in mid-June and 
early July, which would clearly have been a violation of DBT regulations. " 
The approval by DBT also included notification of the state governments in 
states where the testing was to take place. Once the controversy began to erupt, the 
Asia Pulse. "India Bans Imports Containing 'Terminator Gene, '" July 20, 1998. 
http: //www. lexisnexis. corn 
' Ibid. 
' Shiva, Vandana. Stolen Harvest: The Hijacking of the Gtoba/Food Supply. Boston: South End Press. 
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states' response to farmers' anger demonstrated either political calculation or poor 
organization. On November 1$, Karnataka Agriculture Minister C. Byre Gowda 
claimed angrily that he knew of the trials, but had not been informed of the locations 
where the trials were taking place. ' The government did not release the locations of the 
test plots until November 24. These announcements fueled news reports that the state 
government had not been notified at all. This notion, and even the notion that the 
locations of the tests were completely unknown, were refuted to an extent when Byre 
Gowda admitted on November 25 that MMB had followed all DBT guidelines and that 
DBT had indeed notified the Karnataka government. Subsequent reports would explain 
that DBT had notified the secretaries of state in those states where the tests were located, 
as well as district collectors in those districts where tests were taking place. ' 
At the press conference where he acknowledged that the state government had 
been notified by the DBT, Byre Gowda made his key announcement. In response to 
continuing reports of terminator" seeds planted in Karnataka, the state would create a 
state oversight board. The State Biotechnology Coordination Committee (SBCC) would 
have authority to "inspect, regulate and take punitive action in case of violations of 
statutory provisions" on all matters involving agricultural, biomedical, and industrial 
biotechnology. When asked about the panel, Monsanto leaders expressed support for 
the SBCC. The creation of the committee was authorized under the Central 
Indian Express. "Seeds of Controversy, " November 18, 1998 http://www. lexisnexis. corn 
"Hindu. "Monsanto Defends Trials of Cotton Plant, " November 26, 1998 http: //lexisnexis. corn 
Hindu. "Panel to Check Field Trials of Terminator Gene Technology, " November 25, 1998 
http: //www. lexisnexis. corn 
' Hindu. "Monsanto Defends Trials of Cotton Plant" See 36. 
Hindu. "Panel to Check Field Trials of Terminator Gene Technology" See 37. 
Environmental Protection Act of 1986. The Kamataka SBCC eventually served as a 
model for other Indian states' biotechnology oversight panels. These committees have 
come to play active roles in states' regulation of biotechnology. 
The brewing controversy also appeared in the Andhra Pradesh state assembly in 
November, shortly before the KRRS' first action, In a discussion about current growing 
conditions, assembly members began to discuss the reports lrom farmers' groups that the 
crops being grown were actually tests of the "terminator. " Despite assurances Irom state 
agriculture minister K. Vidyadher Rao that the technology did not exist, the assembly 
passed a unanimous measure accusing Monsanto of camouflaging the seeds as Bollgard 
seeds, and urging the central government to ban the "terminator. '" 
Similar outcry about the purported secrecy in Karnataka spread to the Indian 
parliament's upper house, the Rajya Sabha. On December 1, the body discussed the 
issue, with a broad spectrum of legislators supporting a ban on the technology. 
Minister of Agriculture Som Paul assured lawmakers that the government had taken 
steps to prevent the gene's entry into India. He described the technology as a "global 
threat" to farmers, but professed confidence in his ministry's ability to keep the situation 
under control through careful monitoring of imports, " His confidence was not shared 
by other Rajya Sabha members, who described the technology as part of a "diabolical 
Statesman "Andhra house asks Centre to stop 'Terminator' seed, " November 26, 199S. 
http: //www. lexisnex is. corn 
Hindustan Times. "Govt. to keep door shut on terminator seeds, " December I, I 99S. 
http: //www. lexisnexis. corn 
' Ibid. 
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plot" and as a means to "biological warfare. '" Seven lawmakers joined to urge Som 
Pau! not to allow the seeds to enter the nation through official or "backdoor" methods, 
through which the supposed 'terminator seeds' had presumably passed. 
As political pressure to take action increased, the Andhra Pradesh state 
government relented on December 2. Vidyadher Rao announced that, in consultation 
with chief minister N. Chandrababu Naidu, the decision was made to pull ail of MMB's 
Bollgard test crops in the state. ' V idyadher Rao was quoted as saying that the decision 
was at least partially in response to the actions of KRRS, which had burned a field in the 
village of Urugaonda the day before. The announcement stopped tests in eleven 
villages. Monsanto India's director, M. K. Sharma, would later claim that he had not 
been notified by the government, a claim that Andhra Pradesh ofiicials would deny. 
With the trials in Andhra Pradesh stopped (although Sharma's comments suggest 
that they may not have stopped immediately atter the press announcement because of 
confusion over the official letter), the national parliament continued to debate the issue. 
In the lower house, officials f'rom the Communist party called for a ban on any future 
Monsanto tests involving cotton and urged the government to withdraw irom the IISC- 
Monsanto joint research agreement. In the upper house, a motion was passed 50 
unanimously demanding a ban on importation of the seeds. Agriculture minister Som 
Paul assured the legislators that such a measure was already in place, repeating his 
Ibid. First quote by K. R. Malkani, second by S. M. Krishna 
' Hiadv, "Terminator seeds not to be allowed, December 2, 1998. http: //www. lexisnexis. corn 
"Indian Express, "Monsanto told to stop field trials, " December 2, 1998. http: //www. lexisnexis. corn 
Business Line, "No setback for trial data, says co. December 5, 1998. http: //www. lexisnexis. corn 
Agence France Presse, "Opposition demands ban on 'terminator gene' tests in india", December 4, 
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assurances I'rom two days before, while also pointing out that the Br tests had been 
approved and would continue. " 
With the end of the KRRS protests, the debate calmed, and much of the angry 
rhetoric stopped. The notion of the 'terminator' continued, even past the announcement 
that technology would not be commercialized. One ongoing effect of the 'terminator' 
controversy was the impact of the trade restrictions placed on seeds that might contain 
the gene. Because of the perceived importance of keeping the gene out of India, seed 
importers have been required to affirm that their seeds do not contain any genes with 
'terminator' technology. 
One instance in which the 'terminator' idea returned to prominence came in 
2000, when a small controversy briefly erupted when a Times of India news article went 
out to wire services questioning whether Punjab had the ability to test for 'terminator' 
genes. Professors at Punjab Agricultural University and offlcials with the Punjab State 
Council for Science and Technology replied to inquiries by pointing that little was 
known about the gene and that consequently there was no ability to test for the gene. 
In response to this and other concerns, the Indian Department of Biotechnology 
(DBT) sought to allay fears about any lack of 'terminator' testing facilities by promoting 
a new biocontaimnent facility that was nearing completion. " The facility, supported by 
the Rockefeller Foundation and located in New Delhi at the Indian Agricultural 
Resource Institute, was opened in September 2000 as a portal to develop and use 
" Asia Pulse, "Terminator seeds not be [sic] allowed in India: Minister", December 3, 1998. 
http: //www. lexisnexis. corn 
' Times of/ndia, "No Facility to Test Terminator Genes" April 8, 2000. http: //www. lexisnexis. corn 
' Business Line, "Transgenic Test Facility Soon" June 22, 2000. http: //www. lexisnexis. corn 
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molecular probes to check for transgenes on all genetic material coming into India. In a 
statement, Dr. Manju Sharma, the director of DBT, claimed that the opening of the 
facility would ensure that "all the fears of the entry of terminator technology into India 
can be forgotten". Indeed, the presence of the facility seemed to calm at least some 
fears about the technology. 
This concern about keeping 'terminator' seeds out of India remained strong as 
the ongoing debates about plant breeder rights and approval of Bt cotton continued. 
Both laws ended up with anti-'terminator' provisions. The PBR bill contained a 
requirement that each plant breeder sign an affidavit that the variety being protected did 
not contain any 'terminator' technology. In addition, before Bt cotton could be 
approved, Mahyco was required to have the seed tested for the 'terminator' gene by an 
Indian lab. ' . While the location of the testing is unclear, it was implied that this is the 
type of testing for which the DBT New Delhi facility was built. 
With PBR in place and Bt cotton cleared for use, the issue finally died, although 
it seems that any future moves by plant biotechnology companies to protect their IPR 
through genetic means would likely re-ignite the passions of those who opposed the 
'terminator' the first time. 
Mehra, K. L. "Plant Variety Bill Does Safeguard Farmers' Rights, " Economic Times December 16, 
2000. http: //www. lexisnexis. corn 
Times of Jrrdia, "'Open Dialogue on GM Crops is a Shut Case, '" June 16, 2001. 
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Monsanto 
In its initial dealings in India, Monsanto had largely worked alone in seeking 
approval of its Bollgard cotton. After being stymied in its 1993 attempts to seek 
approval, the company decided to work more closely with respected Indian agricultural 
agencies and corporations. One key aspect of this new approach was its purchase of a 
26'/e of Mharashta Hybrid Seed Company, or Mahyco, one of India's leading seed 
companies. Mahyco president B. R. Barwale is a hero of Indian agriculture, a winner of 
the World Food Prize who pioneered the introduction of several hybrid strains. The 
Mahyco collaboration instantly gave Monsanto a degree of credibility, which was 
enhanced again when it entered another joint research project with the Indian Institute of 
Science. 
Further, Monsanto had also begun a public relations campaign to promote 
positive images of the company. It began to sponsor religious festivals and other events 
around India, and also made an ultimately ill-fated effort to contribute to a World Bank 
micro loan program in Bangladesh. 
As Monsanto learned about the power of local paruterships in its regulatory 
endeavors, it did not apply similar lessons in its public relations in the midst of the 
'terminator' controversy. In its initial response to the public outcry, the company's top 
officials spoke about the company's perspective on the situation. Initially, these officers 
were primarily American or British. This approach (whether intentional or not) changed 
Rai, Sharita, "Seeds of Controversy, " Indian Express. November 18, 1998. http: //www. lexisnexis. corn 
' Times (London). "Monsanto's Bangladesh Parinership Is Scrapped. July 29, 1998. 
http: //www. lexisnexis. corn The organization in Bangladesh with which Monsanto sought to work 
ultimately terminated the cooperation agreement atter receiving many threats and protests from 
environmental and social organizations. 
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as communications were shifted to native Indians within the organization, notably 
Meena Vaidyanathan, the communications director for Monsanto India. As the 
controversy began to escalate in November 1998, a more conscious effort emerged to 
portray Monsanto with an Indian face. 
It appears that Monsanto did not initially believe the situation in India to be as 
serious as it ultimately became. Knowing the untruthfulness of the claims that the test 
plots were actually 'terminator' test plots, it was likely easy for Monsanto to disregard 
the KRRS at first. As the rhetoric turned more militant, it appears that Monsanto 
officials began to realize, slowly, that action needed to be taken. This action did not 
come until mid-December, 1998, when the company began to run full-page 
advertisements in national newspapers explaining the company's perspective on the 
issue. ' By that point, most of the damage had been done: the angry farmers' protests 
had been displayed on news stations around the world. 
Monsanto's collaboratory approach did lead to a significant unintended 
consequence in the middle of the media furor. With agreements with the IISC and 
Mahyco in place, any statements against the protests by Batwaie or IISC scientists or 
their collaborators were instantly dismissed as 'tainted' by Monsanto's money. 59 
Complicating matters more was the assumption that IISC was working on the 
'terminator' gene. This put IISC in the delicate position of defending their interests 
while maintaining friendly ties with Monsanto. 
' Mi stry, Shared, "Monsanto on the Defensive, Kicks Off Ad Campaign, " December 8, 1998. 
Asia Pulse, "No Work on Terminator Genes for Indian Monsanto Project, " August 19, 1998. 
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Aller the conn oversy had ended in India, another ten months elapsed before 
Monsanto announced that the technology in question would not be commercialized. 
This is commonly attributed to the widespread criticisms of the technology, as well as 
the June 1998 speech given by Dr. Gordon Conway, president of the Rockefeller 
Foundation. After being invited to speak to the Monsanto Board of Directors, Conway 
shocked the members by offering a stinging rebuke of the company's business practices, 
including its continued support of the GURT. Conway then went public with his 
charges, putting the onus on Monsanto. 
This also came shortly before the public announcement of troubles with the 
proposed Monsanto-DIPL merger. The merger fell apart in December 1999, when, 
after numerous delays, the company announced that it could not reach an agreement with 
the US Department of Justice over the antitrust issues in the case. In October, when 
Monsanto President Robert Shapiro wrote his letter announcing that the technology 
would not be commercialized, the numerous complications with the merger also were 
likely to have contributed to the decision. ' That fact, combined with the enormous 
negative publicity that Monsanto was receiving for a technology it did not technically 
own, must have made the trouble of continuing much greater than any difficulties in 
discontinuing the technology. 
See Lambrecbt 1999. 
" Reuters. "Seed Company Aims Protest at Monsanto, " New York Times, December 22, 1999. 
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NGOs and Farmers ' Groups 
The manner in which nongovernmental organizations and farmers' groups 
worked together to fight the 'terminator' provides an early and useful example of the 
new synergy among activist groups. The initial alarm I?om RAFI in Canada made its 
way to India, where word got to the KRRS. The field burnings were witnessed by 
members of GRAIN and other groups who also seem to have liaised with the media who 
covered the burning. 
An interesting insight to the experiences of the protesters can be gained by 
examining Visvanathan and Parmar's paper discussing the KRRS' participation in an 
anti-globalization caravan in Switzerland. ' They point out that the only farmers who 
participated in the protests were those who could afford to do so; most of them had 
gained their middle- or upper-class status as a result of the Green Revolution. As such, 
Visvathan and Parmar suggest that they may not have represented the voices of the 
farmers as much as the mainline farmers' groups who largely condemned the burnings, 
and whose counsel to the farmer and former KRRS member Shankrikoppa likely 
prevented additional burnings. 
While not covered in this paper, the manner in which the information was spread could prove to be a 
fascinating area for additional research 
" Visvanathan and Parmar, 2718-2723. 
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CONCLUSION 
In examining the events in India around the "terminator gene, " the historical 
significance of the conn oversy is rather unclear. Was it a freak occurrence, devoid of 
meaning, or part of a larger, more widespread trend? The answers lie within Indian 
history and changes in the global political situation. The burning of the crops was 
indeed the first time citizens in the developing world had taken destructive actions 
against biotechnology, but the protests also fell within the tradition of Indian anti- 
globalization protests dating to the early 1990s. The farmers and activists who fought 
the technology used slogans, like "Quit India, " that harked back to India's independence 
movement. These phrases had been used before in previous anti-globalizations 
campaigns to great success, and their use in the 'terminator' controversy provided 
continuity among the protest actions. The activists were able to bring their message to a 
wide audience though their media savvy. 
Although the techniques used by the activists were not new, the parties 
responding to the controversy had not been in similar situations before. Prior to the 
events in India, Monsanto had never faced protests in the developing world. Further, 
Monsanto never had actually possessed the technology in question, which was still 
owned by DIPL. Because of this, Monsanto seemingly set itself up for the problem to 
be magnified by ignoring it until the controversy had already exploded. Likewise, the 
Indian agriculture intrastructure had not yet dealt with the collective might of NGOs and 
farmers' groups, and these groups' allies in the political arena were able to make the 
agriculture officials uncomfortable with the calls they were forced to make. 
As a result of the media drubbing both the Indian government and Monsanto 
received over their handling of the situation, both developed their ability to work in the 
context of similar protests. This ultimately served both as Br cotton made its way 
through the regulatory system, receiving its final approval in late 2001. Ironically, the 
final legislative approval was rushed through the Indian parliament amid news that 
thousands of farmers throughout India had obtained unlicensed, illegal Bt cotton seed 
(the unauthorized seed that the GURT was designed to prevent from being used), and 
had already begun to grow it, paying no heed to the deliberate debate taking place in the 
parliament. ' In the end, it seems that the KRRS did get its wish in that disenfranchised 
farmers ultimately did end up holding the power, but these farmers' choices reflected 
their desire for a better life, rather than fears about the technology. 
Newell, 8-11. 
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